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Summary
Market-based instruments are believed to create more efficient incentives for firms to adopt new
technologies than command-and-control policies. We compare the effects of a direct technology
regulation and of an adoption subsidy under asymmetric information about the costs of techno-
logical advances in controlling the socially undesirable activities. We show that the policy maker
may want to commit to her policy. The reason is that asymmetric information about adop-
tion costs induces the policy maker to set subsidy levels that increase over time; firms, expecting
higher subsidies in the future, postpone investment. Direct regulation offers a commitment pos-
sibility that allows to prevent firms from postponing investment.
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market-based instruments
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1 INTRODUCTION
It is often argued that significant reductions in socially undesirable effects
of economic activities can be achieved through a more widespread adop-
tion of new technologies. The adoption of these technologies is frequently
encouraged with regulatory policy. Let us discuss some examples. In order
to limit the noise produced by motor vehicles, the European Commission
has passed a directive that provides standards for tires and their fitting.
To tackle polluting emissions, several countries have stimulated firms and
households to purchase energy-efficient appliances and equipment. To this
end both, subsidies (for example, the existing subsidy on the purchase of
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soot filters for diesel cars in the Netherlands) and direct regulation (e.g.,
the mandatory building energy codes that exist in most American states)
have been used. To improve safety on the roads, the Dutch government
encouraged road exploiters to introduce additional 30 km speed limit zones
in the cities and towns and provided a subsidy to this end. With the same
goal of road safety improvement, EU safety standards exist for bycicles and
car seats for children. For the benefit of preventing health hazards, in the
Netherlands house owners and tenants used to be subsidized to replace lead
drinking water pipes, in the Dutch restaurants smoking is prohibited and
there exist international ISO safety standards.1 Finally, in order to induce
a certain quality level of desirable goods and services produced, many a
country formulates requirements for production technology that is applied by
a number of professions (among others, pharmacists, financial institutions,
health centers, etc.). Meeting these requirements is in some cases manda-
tory (financial institutions worldwide usually have to fullfil strict requirements
to get an operating licence); in other cases it is stimulated fiscally (e.g., in
the Netherlands, general practitioners were subsidized to switch to electronic
patient files).
It happens frequently that economic agents whose activity results in a
socially undesirable effect, are relatively small and numerous. As the above
examples suggest, when confronted with the necessity to regulate such agents,
policy makers often choose between the direct regulation instrument and
the market-based instrument subsidy on technology adoption.2 Many econo-
mists believe that market-based instruments of regulatory policy create more
efficient incentives to adopt new technologies than command-and-control
instruments. Perhaps the most important reason is that the latter tend to
force regulated agents to take on similar shares of controlling for undesir-
able effects, regardless of the cost. Policy makers, however, often give pref-
erence to direct regulation. In this paper we show that in a world in which
the regulated agents have private information on the costs of technolog-
ical advances in controlling for undesirable effects,3 a policy maker may
want to commit to her policy. Command-and-control instruments offer this
1 Standard 3691, for example, specifies the safety requirements for the manufacture, appli-
cation, operation and maintenance of powered industrial trucks.
2 When the regulated agents are small and numerous, the otherwise widely used tax instru-
ment has an important disadvantage in terms of the relative difficulty of the monitoring job
it implies. Under the subsidy, monitoring is relatively easier as the instrument puts the burden
of proof on the regulated agents. These agents must show that they use the ’right ’ technology
to claim the award (Russell and Powell (1999)). It is thus no coincidence that in the above
examples, regulatory policy mostly involves either a direct regulation or a subsidy.
3 This assumption is frequently seen as reasonable in the literature: see, e.g., Cadot and
Sinclair-Desgagne´ (1996).
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commitment possibility and thus may have an important advantage over
market-based instruments.
We develop a model for comparing policy outcomes under a direct
technology regulation on the one hand and under an adoption subsidy on
the other hand. The model revolves around a policy maker who cares about
reducing the undesirable effects of an economic activity, the financial posi-
tion of the government4 and the financial position of firms.5 Reducing the
undesirable effects requires that firms adopt a new technology. The policy
maker can compel firms to adopt the new technology or she can encour-
age the adoption of the new technology by subsidizing it. Three features of
our model are worth mentioning. First, firms differ in the adoption costs.6
Second, our model is a model of asymmetric information: the policy maker
does not observe the adoption cost of specific firms. Finally, our model is
dynamic. The implication of the second feature is that in case of direct regu-
lation, the policy maker cannot exempt firms with high adoption costs from
regulation, while in case of a subsidy, the policy maker cannot offer firm-
specific subsidies. The implication of the third feature, is that firms do not
only have to make a decision whether or not to invest, but also have to
decide when to invest.
We show that with forward-looking firms, the policy maker may want
to commit herself. The reason is that when firms expect higher subsidies in
the future, they will postpone investment. The reason why firms may expect
higher subsidies in the future is that asymmetric information about firms’
adoption costs induces the policy maker to set subsidy levels that increase
over time. Basically, the policy maker can prevent firms from postponing
investment in two ways. First, she can choose a sub-optimal high subsidy
level in the first period. Second, she can compel firms to invest.
Our paper contributes to a small but interesting literature that provides
explanations for the discrepancy between economists’ recommendations and
policy makers’ actions concerning the choice of policy instrument. One
stream in this literature focuses on the role of political factors in the decision-
making process. For instance, the seminal paper of Buchanan and Tullock
(1975) suggests that direct regulation is preferred over taxation by the reg-
ulated industry, which may be a politically influential interest group. The
reason is that direct regulation assigns production quota’s to existing firms
and thus may have similar effects to cartel formation, leading to above-
4 As a rule, subsidies are financed with distortionary taxes. The cost of raising $1 public
funds to finance the subsidy amounts thus to $(1+λ)>$1 (Laffont and Tirole 1993, p. 24).
5 In Biglaiser et al. (1995) who analyze different policy instruments used in the land set-aside
programs, the policy maker is influenced by similar concerns.
6 Potential adopters being characterized by a distribution of returns associated with the new
technology is a usual assumption in the probit or rank models of technology diffusion (Jaffe
et al. 2002, p. 47).
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normal profits.7 Glazer and Lave (1996) argue that a government facing a
possibility to lose office to a less environment-concerned competitor may
opt for direct regulation that ensures immediate environmental investment as
opposite to market-based instruments under which firms can postpone invest-
ment. In this paper we analyze how the weights the policy maker puts on dif-
ferent policy goals influence her instrument choice.
Another stream in the literature that tries to explain the disagreement
between economists and policy makers looks for possible flaws of market-
based instruments. Thus, Buchanan (1969) points out that when product
markets are imperfect, a tax leads not only to a reduction in undesirable
activities, but also to further production cuts and increased product prices.
Stavins (1995) argues that the performance of tradeable permits can be
adversely affected by transaction costs.8 Biglaiser et al. (1995) and Gersbach
and Glazer (1999) show that in a dynamic setting tradeable permits and taxes
may create incentives for firms to underinvest in technologies that control for
undesirable activities, in order to restrict possibilities for strengthening the
policy in the future.9 Saracho and Usategui (1994) suggest that an adoption
subsidy, of which the level increases over time, may decrease social welfare
and may reduce adoption speed as potential adopters postpone adoption to
benefit from a higher subsidy.10 The studies pointing out flaws of market-
based instruments, have, however, paid little attention to a formal compar-
ison of direct regulation and market-based instruments.11
Finally, our paper is connected to the studies on the effects of uncertainty
on policy instrument choice. A seminal contribution by Weitzman (1974)
points out that when the function of social benefits of pollution reduction is
sharply curved, i.e. there is a high degree of risk aversion, quantity instru-
ments are preferred to price instruments under uncertainty about costs of
7 See Hahn (1990, pp. 22–25) and Dijkstra (1999) for overviews of later studies on the influ-
ence of interest groups on the instrument choice.
8 Hahn (1984) studies the implications of imperfect product markets for tradeable emission
permits. For a summary of literature analyzing factors negatively affecting the performance of
permits see Stavins (1995).
9 Yao (1988) and Malik (1991) demonstrated, however, that similar effects may occur under
direct regulation if its tightness can be adjusted over time.
10 Saracho and Usategui do not however analyse whether the policy maker has an incentive
to set such a subsidy; we do this in this paper.
11 Two exceptions are Heyes (2001) and Sartzetakis (1997). Sartzetakis (1997) argues that
under incomplete information the negative production effect of marketable emission permits
in oligopolistic product markets is not large enough to mitigate the efficiency advantage of
permits over direct regulation. Heyes (2001) shows that when part but not all of the regu-
lated agents is underreporting their undesirable activities, an optimal tax will have a welfare
cost of giving incorrect marginal abatement incentives to the firms; this cost may under some
conditions result in the superiority of direct regulation.
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pollution control. The reason is that quantity instruments allow for rigid
controllability of the environmental quality achieved (albeit at the price of
uncertainty about the cost of achieving this quality).12
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a static model
of instrument choice in which the policy maker knows the industry average
adoption costs of the new technology, but does not observe the adoption
costs of specific firms. In line with the literature we find that the subsidy
allows the policy maker to screen out firms with high abatement costs, while
direct regulation does not. Direct regulation, however, yields savings on pub-
lic expenditures. In section 3, we show that in a dynamic model, the policy
maker may have an incentive to set a lower subsidy-level in the first period
than in the second period. The idea is that by dividing the market into firms
with low and high adoption costs the policy maker can reduce total spend-
ing on subsidies. Of course, when firms anticipate that the subsidy level is
higher in the second period, they will postpone investment. The punch line
of section 3 is that the policy maker may want to commit herself to a strin-
gent regulatory policy. Direct regulation can be interpreted as such a commit-
ment. In sections 4 and 5 we analyse the influence of uncertainty about the
average industry adoption costs on the policy instrument choice. Section 4
argues that in a static setting, uncertainty makes the subsidy instrument supe-
rior to the command-and-control instrument for a wider range of parameters.
In section 5 we show that in a dynamic setting uncertainty and learning can
be another reason for the policy maker to want to commit to stringent regu-
latory policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 THE BASIC MODEL
We consider an industry that consists of a continuum of firms. Initially, each
firm owns a unit of an old technology, TO . The use of TO leads to an unde-
sirable activity M . The industry undesirable output under TO equal M = MO .
There exists a new technology, TN . When a firm adopts TN , its undesirable
output is completely eliminated. Thus, if a fraction β of the firms adopts the
new technology, M = (1−β)MO .
Each firm i is characterized by an adoption cost parameter ci . This para-
meter captures the cost of adopting TN for firm i . The ci ’s are assumed to
be uniformly distributed on the interval
[
0, 1
α
]
. For an individual firm, there
are no benefits of adopting TN . The implication is that without government
12 There exist quite a few extensions and applications of Weitzman’s analysis (see for refer-
ences, e.g., Cropper and Oates (1992), Montero (2002). Montero (2002) argues, for example,
that incomplete enforcement further increases the relative importance of quantity instruments
under uncertainty. When the costs of pollution control prove to be higher than expected, some
firms choose not to comply thus reducing the total costs of the instrument.
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TABLE 1 – THE EFFECTS OF INSTRUMENTS ON POLICY OUTCOMES IN THE
BASIC MODEL
Outcome/instrument Direct regulation (DR) Subsidies (S)
Undesirable output (M) 0 M0(1−αS)
Public expenditures (G) 0 αS2
Financial position industry (FC) − 12α 12αS2
intervention no firm adopts TN : firms must be motivated to adopt the new
technology.
A policy maker is responsible for the design and implementation of pol-
icy that reduces M . In our model, the policy maker can choose between two
instruments. First, the policy maker can compel firms to adopt TN . We refer
to this option as direct regulation (DR). Under direct regulation, all firms
adopt TN . We abstract from monitoring and enforcement costs and limit
attention to two consequences of direct regulation: the undesirable output is
eliminated, MDR = 0, and firms fully bear the cost of the adoption of TN .
Direct regulation thus affects the financial position of firms. The effect of DR
on the financial position of the entire industry is: FCDR =−
∫ 1
α
0 αidi =− 12α .
Second, the policy maker can subsidize the new technology. We assume that
the policy maker knows the distribution of the ci ’s, but does not observe
the adoption cost of specific firms. As a consequence, the policy maker can-
not offer firm-specific subsidies. The policy maker can thus choose a subsidy
S, and firms decide whether or not to adopt TN . In our model, subsidizing
the new technology has three consequences. It reduces undesirable output of
the industry. Assuming that all firms for which ci ≤ S adopt TN , we obtain
that MS =
∫ 1
α
S M0αdi = M0(1−αS).13 Moreover subsidizing TN leads to public
expenditures, GS =αS2. Finally, subsidizing TN affects the financial position
of the industry, FCS . Industry expenditures on TN are
∫ S
0 αidi = 12αS2, while
industry receipts are αS2. This implies that FCS = 12αS2. Table 1 summarizes
the consequences of the choice of policy instrument for policy outcomes.
Basically, Table 1 shows that the choice between direct regulation and
subsidies affects undesirable output and has distributional consequences. The
policy maker is concerned with the undesirable output and with the distrib-
utional consequences of regulatory policy. Her preferences are described by
the following quadratic-linear utility function:
U =−λ1M2 −λ2G + FC, with λ1 >0 and λ2 >1 (1)
13 We assume that firms which expect not to loose from adopting TN adopt TN . Until sec-
tion 4, this assumtpion implies that firms for which ci ≤ S adopt TN .
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In equation (1), λ1 denotes the weight the policy maker attributes to the
undesirable output target relative to the distributional issue. One interpreta-
tion of parameter λ2 is that it captures who, according to the policy maker,
should bear the costs of regulatory policy. Under this interpretation, the
assumption that λ2 >1 implies that the policy maker finds the financial posi-
tion of the government more important than the financial position of the
industry. An alternative interpretation of λ2 is that costs are attached to col-
lecting taxes required to finance public expenditures We realize that the spec-
ification of the utility function is somewhat ad hoc. However, we believe
that (1) fits reasonable well with political discussions about regulatory pol-
icy. Those discussions often revolve around effectiveness, the consequences
of the policy for the budget and the consequences for the competitiveness of
industry. We employ a quadratic-linear utility function for mathematical
tractability. This form is particularly useful when we introduce instrument
uncertainty into the model (Brainard 1967).
In the next sections we augment the basic model by (a) introducing
dynamics into the model and (b) adding uncertainty about the cost of the
new technology, α. Throughout, the model is used to identify the conditions
under which direct regulation delivers a higher utility for the policy maker
than subsidies.
We are aware that our model is rudimentary. We abstract from numer-
ous important aspects of regulatory policy that are relevant for the evalua-
tion of policy instruments. For example, it is well-known that subsidies may
encourage undesirable activities, whereas direct regulation may discourage
these activities. We ignore this aspect by assuming that the choice of instru-
ment does not influence production decisions (neither at the firm level nor at
the industry level). The advantage of our simple model is that it enables us
to focus on the implications of asymmetric information and uncertainty for
the evaluation of alternative policy instruments.
2.1 Optimal Choice of Policy Instrument in the Basic Model
We evaluate DR and S on the basis of equation (1). Using (1) and the out-
comes under DR (presented in the first column of Table 1), it immediately
follows that the policy maker’s utility equals:
UDR =− 12α (2)
Now suppose that S is the instrument. The optimal value of S results from
maximizing (1) with respect to S, given the outcomes presented in the second
column of Table 1. This yields:
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S = λ1M
2
O
αλ1M2O +λ2 − 12
(3)
Equation (3) shows that S increases with λ1 and MO , and decreases with α
and λ2. Substitution of (3) into (1) gives policy maker’s utility under S:
US =−
λ1M2O
(
λ2 − 12
)
αλ1M2O +λ2 − 12
(4)
Using (2) and (4), it is easy to show that S is given preference over DR if
α <α I = λ2 −
1
2
2λ1M2O (λ2 −1)
(5)
where α I denotes the value of α for which the policy maker is indifferent
between S and DR. From the analysis the following three results emerge.
First, if λ2 ≤ 1 (contrary to what we have assumed), then S is always supe-
rior to DR. Second, if λ2 > 1 (as assumed), then the policy maker prefers S
to DR when the industry average adoption costs are high (low α). Third, the
attractiveness of DR increases with λ1 and MO . To understand these results
first note that DR leads to a “corner solution”: no undesirable output and
firms bear the total costs of TN . In our model, S is a more flexible instru-
ment. It allows for the possibility that firms with high adoption costs do not
adopt the new technology. Because the marginal benefits of reducing unde-
sirable output go to zero if S goes to 1
α
, flexibility is an attractive property
of an instrument.14 To put it differently, if the policy maker could observe
the ci ’s, then under DR she would exempt high cost firms from the oblig-
ation to adopt TN . Clearly, the more the policy maker cares about reducing
the undesirable output (higher λ1), the less the policy maker values flexibility.
The advantage of DR is that it does not involve costly redistribution from
the government to the industry.
3 DYNAMIC SETTING
So far we have analyzed which factors influence the instrument choice when
the policy decision is made once and for all. Now we will examine how
the introduction of dynamics into the model affects the choice of the policy
instrument. For notational simplicity we abstract from discounting.
We split our model into two parts. In period 1, with length of time
Z < 1, the policy maker chooses the policy instrument. In period 2, with
14 This is not the case if at MO → 0, the marginal benefit of reducing emissions is higher
than 1α .
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length of time 1− Z , she can adjust the policy chosen. We make two alternat-
ing assumptions concerning the behavior of the firms. First, we assume that
firms are naive, i.e. in every period firm i maximizes its profit in that period.
Second, we assume that firms are forward-looking: when taking the invest-
ment decision, firm i maximizes its total profit over two periods.
It is easy to verify that if the policy maker chooses DR, introducing
dynamics has no important implications. The reason is that under DR emis-
sions are completely eliminated in period 1 and no government intervention is
needed in period 2. The remaining part of this section analyzes how dynamics
affects the adoption subsidy.
3.1 Naive Firms
Let S1(S1 ≥0) denote the subsidy level in period 1 and let S2(S2 ≥ S1) denote
the subsidy level in period 2. In line with the previous section we assume that
(1) in period 1 all firms for which ci ≤ S1 adopt TN , and (2) in period 2 all
firms for which S1 < ci ≤ S2 adopt TN . By setting S2 > S1 the policy maker
may differentiate the subsidy level between firms with high and low adoption
costs. In such a way extra undesirable output can be avoided with relatively
low expenditures in period 2.15 By choosing S2 > S1 the policy maker post-
pones part of the reduction in undesirable output in order to gain a cut in
the government expenditures.
Consider the dynamic version of the model of section 2. It is easy to verify
that in our two-period model policy outcomes are:
M1 = M0 (1−αS1)
G1 =αS21
FC1 = 12αS
2
1
in period 1, and
M2 = M0 (1−αS2)
G2 =αS2(S2 − S1)
FC2 =−12αS
2
2 +
1
2
αS21 +αS2 (S2 − S1)
in period 2. Using the above expressions we can write the dynamic version of
the policy maker’s utility function (1) as:
15 The reason for savings in expenditures is that the high subsidy of period 2 is not spent on
firms with low adoption costs. Note that the existence of these savings hinges on the assump-
tion λ2 >1.
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−Zλ1M20 (1−αS1)2−(1−Z)λ1M20 (1−αS2)2 −λ2
[
αS21+αS2 (S2−S1)
]
−1
2
αS22 +αS21 +αS2 (S2 − S1) (6)
Differentiating (6) with respect to S2 and solving the first-order condition
yields:
S∗2 =
2(1− Z)λ1M20 + (λ2 −1)S1
2(1− Z)αλ1M20 +2λ2 −1
(7)
The cut-off value of S1 implying S∗2 = S1 equals:
Ss1 =
2(1− Z)λ1M2O
2(1− Z)αλ1M2O +λ2
(8)
S1 < Ss1 is a necessary condition for the policy maker to set S2 > S1. From
(8) it is easy to derive that Ss1 decreases with Z . The shorter period 2 (the
larger Z ), the less utility the policy maker gets from extra decrease in unde-
sirable output in that period and the less she is inclined to set S2 > S1.
Lemma 3.1 If Z ≥ 12 , then S2 = S1.
Proofs of this and other results are in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.1 states that the policy maker will never differentiate the subsidy
between firms with high and low costs if the low undesirable output of period
2 cannot be produced for a longer time than the higher undesirable output of
period 1.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose Z < 12 . Then S2 > S1 if and only if λ2 >
1−Z
1−2Z .
Proposition 3.1 indicates that if period 2 is longer than period 1 and the
shadow cost of public funds, λ2, is sufficiently large, the policy maker chooses
a higher level of subsidy in period 2 than in period 1. To understand why
for small values of λ2 S2 = S1, note that when λ2 = 1, subsidy differentia-
tion is never optimal. The reason is that postponing part of the reduction in
undesirable output yields no reductions in total expenditures. To make post-
poning attractive, λ2 has to be sufficiently large.
3.2 Forward-Looking Firms
Above we have shown that if (1) firms are naive, (2) period 1 is shorter than
period 2 and (3) the shadow cost of public funds is sufficiently large, then
the policy maker differentiates the subsidy between firms with high and low
adoption costs. An advantage of subsidies in a dynamic setting seems that
the policy maker is able to mitigate the negative implications of the shadow
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TABLE 2 – THE STRUCTURE OF THE GAME BETWEEN THE POLICY MAKER AND
THE FIRMS
Period 1
(1) The policy maker chooses the subsidy value: S1 ∈
[
0, 1α
]
.
(2) Firms observe S1, each firm decides whether or not to invest.
Period 2
(3) The policy maker chooses whether or not to adjust the subsidy: S2 ∈
[
S1, 1α
]
.
(4) Firms observe S2, each firm using T0 decides whether or not to invest.
cost of public funds. In this section, we show that appearances can be mis-
leading. If firms are forward-looking, then the opportunity to differentiate
the subsidy may lead to postponement of policy or to a too high level of
subsidy.
We assume that the policy maker wants to differentiate the subsidy, i.e.
λ2 >
1−Z
1−2Z >0. The stages of the game are described in Table 2.
To solve the game we will look for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. To
facilitate the exposition of the results we first introduce some notation. Let
q denote the adoption cost of the firm that is indifferent between investing
and not investing in TN in period 1. Furthermore, let βt denote the share of
firms investing in period t . Without loss of generality we assume that when
the policy maker is indifferent between alternative values of S1, she chooses
the lowest of them; when firm i is indifferent between investing in period 1
or in period 2, firm i invests in period 1.
To ensure a time-consistent solution, we first analyze behavior in period
2. Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 describe the optimal actions of firms and the
optimal action of the policy maker, respectively.
Lemma 3.2 A firm invests in period 2 if ci > q and ci ≤ S2; otherwise a firm
does not invest in period 2.
Lemma 3.3 If q < 2(1−Z)λ1M
2
O
2(1−Z)αλ1M2O+λ2
, then S2 = 2(1−Z)λ1M
2
O+(λ2−1)q
2(1−Z)αλ1M2O+2λ2−1
; otherwise
S2 = S1.
Lemma 3.2 gives the decision rule of a firm: invest if the subsidy exceeds the
cost; otherwise do not invest. Basically, this decision rule is similar to that of
the static model. Lemma 3.3 shows that the optimal level of subsidy depends
on the share of firms that has invested in period 1. If this share is small, then
the policy rule is similar to that of the static model. If it is large, then S2= S1.
Now that we have derived the players’ optimal actions in period 2, let us
analyze what can happen in period 1. First consider firm behavior. Firms
anticipate policy in period 2. Clearly, if S2 > S1, no firm has an incentive to
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invest in period 1. Provided a firm invests, it will invest in that period in
which the subsidy offered is highest. Lemma 3.4 directly follows from this
result.
Lemma 3.4 If one or more firms invest in period 1(β1 > 0),no firm will invest
in period 2. If one or more firms will invest in period 2 (β2 >0), no firm invests
in period 1.
We are now ready to identify the equilibria of the game.
Proposition 3.2 The game between the policy maker and the firms has two
equilibria.
(I) the policy maker sets S1 = 0 and S∗2 =
2(1−Z)λ1M2O
2(1−Z)αλ1M2O+2λ2−1
; no firm invests
in period 1, firms for which ci ≤ S2 invest in period 2.
(II) the policy maker sets S1 = 2(1−Z)λ1M
2
O
2(1−Z)λ1M2Oα+λ2
and S2 = S1; firms for which
ci ≤ S1 invest in period 1 and no firm invests in period 2.
Let us compare the two equilibria of the game described in Proposition
3.2. In the first equilibrium the policy maker postpones regulatory policy to
period 2. In comparison with the static model the level of subsidy is low.
The reason is that postponement reduces the benefits of the subsidy. Hence,
a potential cost of the opportunity to differentiate the subsidy is undesirable
output in period 1. In the second equilibrium, the opportunity to differentiate
the policy leads to a high level of subsidy in period 1 (S1 in equilibrium II is
higher than S in the static model without uncertainty about α). The level of
subsidy is too high in the sense that if the policy maker were able to com-
mit herself to a lower subsidy, she would do so. The reason that the level
of subsidy is high is that a lower level would induce the policy maker to set
S2 > S1. From the above discussion we know that S2 > S1 means that no firm
will invest in period 1. To prevent firms from postponing to invest, the policy
maker chooses a high level of subsidy.
Let us now elaborate upon the conditions under which each of the equilib-
ria can occur. First, it is worth noting that in our game the policy maker is
the first-mover. By choosing S1, she can select “the equilibrium of the game”.
More precisely, which equilibrium occurs depends on which of the equilibria
is optimal from the policy maker’s point of view. Above we have already dis-
cussed the pros and cons of the equilibria. We know that if the policy maker
assigns high priority to fighting the undesirable output, she is ready to incur
higher costs to achieve a reduction in it. Therefore, if the government cares
much about reducing the undesirable output, the second equilibrium is likely
to occur. The policy maker can avoid a high level of subsidy by postpon-
ing policy. The cost is undesirable output in period 1. Thus, the first equi-
librium is likely to occur if the policy maker does not care much about the
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undesirable output and faces a large shadow cost of public funds, or if the
length of period 1, Z , is small.
In the above setting the flexibility of the subsidy instrument may lead to
strategic behaviour with negative welfare implications when the first period is
shorter than the second period.16 In the next sections we analyse another case
when the policy maker may want to increase the subsidy level strategically,
namely uncertainty about the adoption costs of the industry.
4 THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ADOPTION COSTS ON THE CHOICE
OF INSTRUMENT
In this section we introduce uncertainty about adoption costs of the new
technology into the static model of section 2. In the next section the effects
of uncertainty in a dynamic model will be analysed. In the augmented model,
the parameter α can take the value α+h or take the value α−h, with h <α.
Each possibility occurs with probability 0.5. Firms know α, but the policy
maker does not. We ask ourselves how does uncertainty about α affect the
choice of policy instrument.
Suppose that the policy maker chooses DR. As in section 2, DR implies
that undesirable output is eliminated and that firms fully bear the adoption
costs of the new technology. Under DR, the policy maker’s expected utility
equals:
E (UDR)=− α
2
(
α2 −h2) (9)
where E is the expectation operator. The implication of uncertainty about α
is that the financial position of the industry becomes uncertain. Equation (9)
shows that an increase in h decreases the policy maker’s expected utility.
Now suppose S is the policy instrument. The policy maker’s expected util-
ity as a function of S is:
E(US)= 12
{
−λ1M2O [1− (α −h) S]2 +
(
1
2
−λ2
)
(α −h) S2
}
+1
2
{
−λ1M2O [1− (α +h) S]2 +
(
1
2
−λ2
)
(α +h) S2
}
=−λ1M2O
[
1−2αS +
(
α2 +h2
)
S2
]
+
(
1
2
−λ2
)
αS2 (10)
Equation (10) shows that under S, h affects the policy maker’s expected
utility through the undesirable output objective. Thus, a difference between
16 As the amount of the subsidy offered is often being reconsidered in the beginning of a
new year, Z < 12 may be the case if the subsidy is introduced during the year.
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the two policy instruments is the way they allocate risk. Under S, risk is
allocated to the undesirable output target, while under DR, the industry
bears the risk. This difference implies that when the policy maker cares much
about the undesirable output (high λ1), she wants to allocate risk to firms
rather than to the undesirable output. She can do so by choosing DR as pol-
icy instrument.17 More generally, the parameters λ1 and λ2 determine how
the policy maker wants to allocate risk.
How does S respond to uncertainty about α? Maximizing (10) with respect
to S yields:
S∗ = λ1M
2
O
α2+h2
α
λ1M2O +λ2 − 12
(11)
From equation (11) is easy to see that S∗ decreases with h. This result is in
line with Brainard (1967) who argues that uncertainty about policy effects
should lead to a conservative use of instruments. Together (10) and (11) pro-
vide an argument for choosing subsidies as policy instrument rather than
direct regulation. Subsidies can be adjusted. This property enables the policy
maker to reduce the adverse consequences of uncertainty.
In summary, uncertainty about adoption costs affects instrument choice
in two ways. First, different instruments allocate risk in different ways. How
risk should be allocated depends on preferences. Second, the introduction of
uncertainty enhances the importance of a flexible instrument.
5 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ADOPTION COSTS IN A DYNAMIC SETTING
In this section we analyze how uncertainty about α affects the level of the
subsidy in a two-period model.18 We assume that period 1 and 2 are of equal
length. From section 3 we know that under this assumption the policy maker
does not differentiate the subsidy between firms with high and low adoption
costs. So, if the policy maker will set S2> S1 in the present model, then uncer-
tainty about α is the cause.
As in section 3, we start the analysis by assuming that (1) in period 1 all
firms for which ci ≤ S1 adopt TN , and (2) in period 2 all firms for which
S1 < ci ≤ S2, adopt TN . Having explained the reason why the policy maker
may want to choose S2 > S1 when firms are naive, we proceed to analyze the
case that firms are forward-looking.
17 We can show that this effect may cause that the policy maker prefers DR to S when
λ2 =1. Recall that in the basic model, the policy maker always prefers S to DR when λ2 =1.
18 As the DR policy cannot be adjusted, its performance under uncertainty in a two-period
model is the same as in the one-period model of section 4.
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5.1 Naive Firms
As in section 4, the parameter α can take the value α + h or the value
α −h with equal probability. Since in period 1 firms for which ci ≤ S1 adopt
TN , the policy maker learns the value of α if S1 > 0. Then, in period 2 the
policy maker makes her decision under certainty. Differentiating period 2
utility
−1
2
λ1M20 (1−αS2)2 −λ2 [αS2 (S2 − S1)]
−1
2
αS22 +
1
2
αS21 +αS2 (S2 − S1) (12)
with respect to S2 yields
S∗2 =
λ1M20 + S1(λ2 −1)
αλ1M20 +2λ2 −1
(13)
Clearly, S2 > S1 requires
S1 <
λ1M2O
αλ1M2O +λ2
(14)
Lemma 5.1 In equilibrium if the policy maker learns that α = α + h then
S2 = S1.
The reason for Lemma 5.1 is obvious. If α is known, then the optimal level
of subsidy is decreasing in α. Uncertainty about α implies that the policy
maker runs the risk of choosing a wrong level. The policy maker, however,
knows that the optimal level of subsidy is equal to (3) either with α =α + h
or with α=α−h. Hence, in period 1 the subsidy level chosen will be at least
(3) with α =α +h; from (13) and (14) it follows that S∗2 = S1 if α =α +h.
Proposition 5.1 gives the condition under which the policy maker chooses
S2 > S1 if she learns that α =α −h.
Proposition 5.1 Let h′ = 12
[√
α¯2 + 2α¯
λ1M2O
− α¯
]
. When h >h′, then S2 > S1 if the
policy maker learns that α=α−h. Otherwise S2= S1 if the policy maker learns
that α =α −h.
Proposition 5.1 shows that if uncertainty about α is sufficiently large, then
the policy maker chooses a higher level of subsidy in period 2 than in period
1 when the costs of adoption of the new technology turn out to be large.
Hence, in a dynamic setting a flexible instrument as subsidies seems to have
the advantage of mitigating the adverse consequences of uncertainty. To
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understand why for small values of h S2 = S1 even if α = α − h, recall from
section 3 that the policy maker does not want to set S2> S1 if the periods are
of equal length. There is a bias against discrimination. To offset this bias, h
should be sufficiently large.
5.2 Forward-Looking Firms
Above we have shown that if (1) firms are naive, and (2) uncertainty about
the effectiveness of subsidy is sufficiently large, then the policy maker bases
policy in period 2 on past experiences. An advantage of subsidies over direct
regulation seems that subsidies give an opportunity for learning. In this sec-
tion, we show that if firms are forward-looking, an opportunity for learning
appears to have negative implications. It may lead to postponement of policy
or to a too high level of subsidy.
With forward-looking firms, we have a game of incomplete information.
The stages of this game are presented in Table 3.
To solve the game, we look for Bayesian–Nash equilibria, in which play-
ers’ strategies are optimal responses to each other, and beliefs are updated
according to Bayes’ rule.
To facilitate the exposition of the results let ρ denote the posterior proba-
bility that α=α+h, and α̂=α+ρh − (1−ρ) h. As in section 3, q denotes the
adoption cost of the firm that is indifferent between investing and not invest-
ing in TN in period 1, and βt denotes the share of firms investing in period t .
Consider first firm behavior. Since firms know α, their actions in period 1 and
period 2 follow the same rules as in section 3 and can be described by Lemma
3.2 and Lemma 3.4. Thus, a firm invests in period 2 if the subsidy exceeds
its adoption cost and otherwise it does not invest. Furthermore, provided a
firm invests, it will invest in that period in which the subsidy offered is high-
est. Let us now turn to the policy maker who in period 1 faces uncertainty
TABLE 3 – THE STRUCTURE OF THE GAME BETWEEN THE POLICY MAKER AND
THE FIRMS
Period 1
(1) Nature draws α and reveals it to the firms but not to the policy maker.
(2) The policy maker chooses the subsidy value: S1 ∈
[
0, 1
α−h
]
.
(3) Each firm observes the policy and decides whether or not to invest.
(4) The policy maker observes the behavior of firms and revises her belief about α.
Period 2
(5) The policy maker chooses whether or not to adjust the subsidy: (S2|α)∈
[
S1, 1α
]
(6) Each firm using T0 observes the policy and decides whether or not to invest.
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about α. Lemma 3.3 with Z = 12 describes the action in period 2 of the policy
maker who has learned the value of α.
We are now ready to identify the possible equilibria of the game. As is
usual in games with incomplete information, our game has pooling and sepa-
rating equilibria. In the pooling equilibrium, the policy maker does not learn
anything about α, implying ρ = 12 . This requires that, irrespective of the value
of α, no firm invests in period 1.19 Consequently, in a pooling equilibrium
the optimal level of subsidy can be calculated in the same way as (11) in
section 4.20
Proposition 5.2 In a pooling equilibrium, the policy maker sets S1=0 and S∗2 =
λ1M2O
α2+h2
α
λ1M2O+2λ2−1
; no firm invests in period 1, firms for which ci ≤ S1 invest in
period 2; ρ, the posterior probability that α =α +h, equals 12 .
The equilibrium described by proposition 5.2 is similar to equilibrium I of
section 3.2. The policy maker postpones policy to period 2 and the optimal
level of subsidy is low in comparison with the static model with uncertainty
about α.
In a separating equilibrium, the policy maker learns α. Learning requires
that in period 1 firm behavior depends on the realization of α. From Lemma
3.4, it directly follows that S2 > S1 and β1 >0 if α =α − h (as in section 5.1)
is not possible when firms are forward-looking. The reason is that when
α=α−h, firms anticipate a subsidy increase and postpone investment. Below
we show that learning requires postponement of policy if α = α − h. If the
policy maker wants to ensure investment in period 1, she has to commit
herself not to make use of the opportunity for learning; we show that she can
do so by offering a too high level of subsidy.
Proposition 5.3 states that there are two separating equilibria.21
Proposition 5.3 There are two separating equilibria.
(I) the policy maker sets S1 = λ1M
2
O
λ1M2O (α−h)+λ2
and S2 = S1; firms for which
ci ≤ S1 invest in period 1 and no firm invests in period 2; if β1= (α +h) S1,
then ρ =1; if β1 = (α −h) S1, then ρ =0
19 To understand why suppose q > 0. In a pooling equilibrium, q must be independent of
α. Consequently, firm q must be indifferent between investing and not investing both when
α =α +h and when α =α −h. As ci is continuous and h >0, this cannot occur.
20 Of course, out-of-equilibrium beliefs are important. In the pooling equilibrium, we assume
that ρ = 12 , irrespective of β1.
21 Several assumptions about out-of equilibrium beliefs can be made which support the equi-
libria presented in Proposition 5.3.
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(II) the policy maker sets S1= λ1M
2
O
λ1M2O (α+h)+λ2− 12
in period 1, and S2= S1 if β1=
(α +h)S1 and S2 = λ1M
2
O
λ1M2O (α−h)+2λ2−1
if β1 =0; if α =α +h firms for which
ci ≤ S1 invest in period 1 and no firm invests in period 2; if α=α−h firms
for which ci ≤ S2 invest in period 2 and no firm invests in period 1; if β1=
(α +h)S1, then ρ =1; if β1 =0, then ρ =0.
Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 imply that our game has three equilibria. Below
we will show that which of them occurs depends on the parameters of the
model. We first compare the equilibria. The main drawback of the pooling
equilibrium is pollution in period 1. The first separating equilibrium is sim-
ilar to equilibrium II of section 3.2. The level of subsidy is too high in the
sense that if the policy maker were able to commit herself to a lower subsidy,
she would do so. However, without the possibility to commit, a lower sub-
sidy level would induce the policy maker to set S2> S1 if she would learn that
α =α − h; this would have the undesirable effect that firms postpone invest-
ment in the new technology as in the pooling equilibrium. In the second sepa-
rating equilibrium, period-2 policy depends on the outcomes in period 1. The
benefit is that the level of subsidy is optimal if α =α + h, and that the level
is adjusted when it turns out that α=α−h. There is also a cost. If α=α−h,
then firms do not invest in period 1.
Let us now discuss the conditions under which each of the equilibria can
occur. As the policy maker is the first-mover in our game, the equilibrium
occurs that is optimal from the policy maker’s point of view. Above we
have already dealt with the pros and cons of the equilibria. We know that
if the policy maker cares much about reducing the undesirable output, she
(1) is ready to incur higher costs in order to achieve reduction of undesir-
able output; (2) allocates high cost to uncertainty about the amount of unde-
sirable output (section 4). Therefore, if the government cares much about
reducing the undesirable output, the first separating equilibrium is likely to
occur. If, in addition, uncertainty about the industry average adoption cost
is high, then the second separating equilibrium becomes attractive. When the
policy maker does not care much about the undesirable output, she prefers
to avoid the high subsidy of the first separating equilibrium, especially when
the shadow cost of public funds is large. This can be done by postponing pol-
icy or by making use of the opportunity for learning. The cost of postponing
policy is undesirable output in period 1 and uncertainty about the amount
of it in both periods. Overall in a dynamic model the introduction of uncer-
tainty about the costs of regulation reduces the attractiveness of the subsidy
in comparison with direct regulation.
Proposition 5.4 gives the conditions under which each of the three equilib-
ria occurs.
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Proposition 5.4 Let h′′ = 2λ2−1
4λ1M20
(h′′ >h′, where h′ is determined in Proposition
5.1.) Then
(i) The second separating equilibrium is feasible if and only if uncertainty is
high enough (h >h′′).
(ii) If the opportunity for learning can be used (h >h′′), then the pooling equi-
librium never occurs. In that case either the opportunity for learning is
made use of (second separating equilibrium) or immediate certain reduction
in undesirable output is achieved at the cost of a too high subsidy (first sep-
arating equilibrium).
(iii) If the opportunity for learning cannot be used (h ≤h′′), then either the pol-
icy is postponed (pooling equilibrium) or immediate certain reduction in
undesirable output is achieved at the cost of a too high subsidy (first sepa-
rating equilibrium).
(iv) The opportunity for learning is welfare improving if (1) uncertainty about
the adoption cost is high relative to the expected value of the industry aver-
age adoption costs
(
h
α¯
>
√
3
3
)
and (2) the policy maker cares much about
the undesirable output (λ1M2O is large). In all other cases the opportunity
for learning is welfare reducing.
(v) If conditions (1) and (2) of (iv) hold, then the second separating equilib-
rium takes place.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Many economists believe that market-based instruments for regulating socially
undesirable activities create more efficient incentives for firms to adopt
new technologies than command-and-control policies. Policy makers, how-
ever, often prefer direct regulation. In this paper we have shown that
under asymmetric information about the costs of technological advances
in controlling for undesirable effects, a policy maker may want to com-
mit to her policy. Command-and-control instruments offer this commitment
possibility and thus may have an important advantage over market-based
instruments.
We have developed a model for comparing the effects of a direct technol-
ogy regulation on the one hand and the effects of adoption subsidy on the
other hand. First, we have studied the case in which the policy decision is
made once and for all. The results we have obtained are generally in line with
the literature on market versus command-and-control instruments. We have
found that the subsidy allows the policy maker to screen out firms with high
abatement costs, while direct regulation does not. Direct regulation, however,
yields savings on public expenditures. Under uncertainty about policy effects
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the flexible subsidy instrument gains in importance except for the case when
the policy maker cares much about reducing the undesirable activity.
Next, we have introduced dynamics into the model. We have found that
with forward-looking firms, the policy maker may want to commit herself.
The reason is as follows. The policy maker may have an incentive to set a
lower subsidy-level in the first period than in the second period. The idea
is that by dividing the market into firms with low and high adoption costs
the policy maker can reduce total spending on subsidies. Furthermore, under
uncertainty about the effectiveness of the subsidy, a lower subsidy in the first
period allows the policy maker to base her policy in the second period on
past experiences. Of course, when forward-looking firms anticipate that the
subsidy level is higher in the second period, they postpone investment. In
our model the policy maker can prevent firms from postponing investment in
two ways. First, she can choose a sub-optimal high subsidy level in the first
period. Second, she can compel firms to invest using direct regulation. Direct
regulation can be interpreted as a commitment.
Our analysis is based on several restrictive assumptions. Some of them are
made for simplification; relaxing these assumptions does not affect our results
qualitatively. For example, in the dynamic version of our model neither the
policy maker nor the firms discount the future. It is easy to show that the
introduction of discounting into our model does not qualitatively affect our
results. Furthermore, we have neglected the fact that in reality usually sev-
eral versions of one technology are available (for example, older and newer
ones), different in price and the extent to which they reduce undesirable activ-
ity. Introducing this aspect into the model and allowing the policy maker to
choose which technology version to compel the firms to, will increase the flex-
ibility of direct regulation, but will not affect the commitment possibility it
provides.
A less innocuous assumption is that regulation does not affect production
decisions of the firms. Relaxing this assumption brings about the issue of the
entry to/exit from the industry and the connected discussion about the effects
of the instruments on the industry level, which we intentionally wanted to
avoid.
Though our results are derived from a highly stylized model, we believe
that they are important for two reasons. First, command-and-control instru-
ments are generally disliked by the economists. We have pointed out sit-
uations, in which the much discussed disadvantages of direct regulation
can turn into its advantages. Second, our analysis has positive implications.
It shows how the preferences of the policy maker affect the instrument
choice when there is asymmetric information about the costs of technologi-
cal advances in controlling the socially undesirable effects.
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APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 3.1
Proof. The policy maker’s utility function in the dynamic setting, U d , con-
sists of two parts. On S1 ≥ Ss1, where Ss1 is given by (8), the utility function
is described by (1) with the values of parameters taken from Table 1; on
S1 < Ss1 it is described by (6). Since both parts of U
d are quadratic in S1 and
∂U d
∂S1 |Ss1 = ∂U
d
∂S1 |S1↑Ss1 , we can conclude that U d has only one maximum in S1.
Thus, if the static optimum subsidy value Sstat as defined by (3) meets the
condition Sstat≥ Ss1, then U d reaches its maximum at Sstat. It is easy to check
that Sstat ≥ Ss1 always holds if Z ≥ 12 . 	unionsq
Proof of proposition 3.1
Proof. Suppose Z < 12 and S
stat as defined by (3). Then it can be checked that
Sstat ≥ Ss1 iff λ2 ≤ 1−Z1−2Z . Consequently, if λ2 > 1−Z1−2Z , then the maximum of U d
lies in the interval S1 < Ss1. We know that if S1 < S
s
1, then S
∗
2 > S1. 	unionsq
Proof of lemma 3.2
Proof. The result of the lemma directly follows from the definition of q. 	unionsq
Proof of lemma 3.3
Proof. By assumption firms for which ci ≤q have invested in period 1. Then
the period-2 utility of the policy maker equals
−(1− Z)λ1M20 (1−αS2)2 −λ2 [αS2 (S2 −q)]
−1
2
αS22 +
1
2
αq2 +αS2 (S2 −q) (15)
Differentiating the above expression with respect to S2 and solving the first-
order condition yields S∗2 =
2(1−Z)λ1M2O+(λ2−1)q
2(1−Z)αλ1M2O+2λ2−1
. It is optimal for the policy
maker to set S2 = S∗2 if S∗2 > q and to set S2 = S1 otherwise. The inequality
S∗2 >q holds if q <
2(1−Z)λ1M2O
2(1−Z)αλ1M2O+λ2
. 	unionsq
Proof of proposition 3.2
Proof. In this proof we show for both equilibria that the strategies of the
firms and the strategy of the policy maker are optimal responses to each
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other. Note that lemma 3.2 and lemma 3.3 describe the optimal behavior of
the firms and the optimal behavior of the policy maker in period 2.
Equilibrium I.
(a) The optimal response of firm i to S2 > S1 is never to invest in period 1
and to invest in period 2 if ci ≤ S2. If all firms follow this strategy, no
firm can be better off by deviating.
(b) As q =0, S2 = 2(1−Z)λ1M
2
O
2(1−Z)αλ1M2O+2λ2−1
(lemma 3.3). Furthermore, as no firm
invests in period 1, it is weakly optimal for the policy maker to set
S1 =0.
Equilibrium II.
(a) The optimal response of firm i to S2 = S1 is to invest in period 1 if ci ≤
S1 and never to invest in period 2. If all firms follow this strategy, no
firm can be better off by deviating.
(b) In order for the strategy of firms to hold in equilibrium, S2 = S1 must
be true. This implies that S1 ≥ Ss1, where Ss1 is given by (8). It is easy to
show that given this constraint, the policy maker maximizes her utility
in period 1 by setting S1 = Ss1 =
2(1−Z)λ1M20
2(1−Z)αλ1M20+λ2
. 	unionsq
Proof of proposition 5.1
Proof. The policy maker’s expected utility function in the dynamic setting
under uncertain α, EU du , consists of two parts: where (14) with α = α¯ − h
does not hold, it is described by (10), and where (14) with α = α¯ − h holds,
it is described by:
1
2
{
−λ1M2O [1− (α +h) S1]2 +
(
1
2
−λ2
)
(α +h) S21
}
+1
2
{
−1
2
λ1M20 (1− (α −h)S1)2 −
1
2
λ1M20 (1− (α −h)S2)2
−λ2
[
(α −h)S21 + (α −h)(S2 − S1)S2
]
−1
2
(α −h)S22 + (α −h)S21 + (α −h)(S2 − S1)S2
}
, (16)
where S2 is defined by (13) with α = α¯ −h.
Since both parts of EU du are quadratic in S1 and ∂EU
du
∂S1 is every-
where continuous, the function has only one maximum in S1. If the sta-
tic optimum under uncertain α (11) does not meet condition (14) with α =
α¯ − h, then EU du reaches its maximum at (11). Otherwise, in the optimum
S1< S2, where S2 is defined by (13) with α= α¯−h. It is easy to show that for
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h ≥ 0 (11) meets (14) with α = α¯ − h iff h > h′ = −λ1M
2
O α¯+
√
(λ1M2O α¯)2+2λ1M2O α¯
2λ1M2O
=
1
2
[√
α¯2 + 2α¯
λ1M2O
− α¯
]
. 	unionsq
Proof of proposition 5.2
Proof. In this proof we proceed along the following steps: (a) we show that
ρ follows from Bayes’ rule given the strategies of the firms; (b) we show that
the strategy of firm i is an optimal response to the strategy of the policy
maker and the strategies of other firms; (c) we show that the strategy of the
policy maker is an optimal response to the strategies of the firms given ρ.
Note that the pooling equilibrium requires q =0 (see footnote 19).
(a) Since no firm invests in period 1, the policy maker does not learn any-
thing about α, and ρ = 12 .
(b) The optimal response of firm i to S2 > S1 is never to invest in period 1
and to invest in period 2 if ci ≤ S2. If all firms follow this strategy, no
firm can be better off by deviating.
(c) As β1 = 0, we can obtain S2 = λ1M
2
O
α2+h2
α
λ1M2O+2λ2−1
analogously to the
derivation of the optimal subsidy value in section 4. Furthermore, as no
firm invests in period 1, it is weakly optimal for the policy maker to set
S1 =0. 	unionsq
Proof of proposition 5.3
Proof. In this proof for every equilibrium we follow the same steps as in
proposition 5.2. Recall from the main text that lemma 3.2 and lemma 3.3
with Z = 12 describe the optimal behavior of the firms and the optimal behav-
ior of the policy maker in period 2.
1. First separating equilibrium
(a) If firms, for which ci ≤ S1, invest in period 1, then β1 = αS1 is
dependent on α. Consequently, the policy maker adjusts her belief
in period 2 to ρ =1 if β1 = (α¯ +h)S1 and to ρ =0 if β1 = (α¯ −h)S1.
(b) The best response of firm i to S2 = S1 is to invest in period 1 if
ci ≤ S1 and never to invest in period 2. If all firms follow this strat-
egy, no firm can be better off by deviating.
(c) In order for the strategy of firms to hold in equilibrium, S2 = S1
must be true for any value of α. This implies that S1 must meet
the condition opposite to (14) with α = α¯ − h. It is easy to show
that given this constraint, the policy maker maximizes her utility in
period 1 by setting S1 = λ1M
2
0
(α¯−h)λ1M20+λ2
.
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2. Second separating equilibrium
(a) If some firms invest in period 1 when α= α¯+h, and no firm invests
in period 1 if α = α¯ − h, then β1 is dependent on α. Consequently,
the policy maker adjusts her belief in period 2 to ρ =1 if β1 = (α¯ +
h)S1 and to ρ =0 if β1 =0.
(b) Suppose α= α¯+h. The best response of firm i to S2= S1 is to invest
in period 1 if ci ≤ S1 and never to invest in period 2. If all firms
follow this strategy, no firm can be better off by deviating. Suppose
now that α = α¯ − h. The best response of firm i to S2 > S1 is never
to invest in period 1 and to invest in period 2 if ci ≤ S2. If all firms
follow this strategy, no firm can be better off by deviating.
(c) From lemma 3.3, we know that if α= α¯−h, then given the strategy
of the firms the policy maker sets S2= λ1M
2
0
λ1M20 (α¯−h)+2λ2−1
. In order for
the strategy of firms to hold in equilibrium, S2 = S1 must be true
if α = α¯ + h and S2 > S1 must be true if α = α¯ − h. In other words,
(i) S1 must meet S1 ≥ λ1M
2
O
(α¯+h)λ1M2O+λ2
(an inequality opposite to (14)
with α= α¯+h) and (ii) S1< λ1M
2
0
λ1M20 (α¯−h)+2λ2−1
must hold. It is easy to
show that if h ≤ ˜h = λ2−1
2λ1M20
, then
λ1M2O
(α¯+h)λ1M2O+λ2
>
λ1M20
λ1M20 (α¯−h)+2λ2−1
and
(i) and (ii) never hold together. Thus, the equilibrium in question
requires h >
˜
h. Suppose this is the case. Then, the expected utility
of the policy maker equals:
1
2
[
−λ1M20 (1− (α¯ +h)S1)2 − (λ2 −
1
2
)(α¯ +h)S21
]
+1
2
[
−1
2
λ1M20−
1
2
λ1M20 (1−(α¯−h)S2)2 −(λ2−
1
2
)(α¯−h)S22
]
(17)
where S2 = λ1M
2
0
λ1M20 (α¯−h)+2λ2−1
. It is straightforward to show that the
above expression is maximized at:
S∗1 =
λ1M20
λ1M20 (α¯ +h)+λ2 − 12
(18)
It is obvious that S∗1 meets condition (i) and it can easily be
checked that S∗1 meets condition (ii) iff h >h
′′ = 2λ2−1
4λ1M20
>h′. 	unionsq
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Proof of proposition 5.4
Proof.
(i) Follows from the proof of proposition 5.3, 2c.
(ii) To prove this result it is sufficient to show that the second separating
equilibrium (IIS) yields a higher payoff to the policy maker than the
pooling equilibrium (P) both, when α = α¯ − h and when α = α¯ + h. If
this is the case, then the expected utility of the policy maker under IIS
is larger than her expected utility under P, and the former equilibrium
always dominates the latter. Suppose that α= α¯−h. Then it is easy to
see that IIS yields a higher utility to the policy maker than P. While
the period-1 utility is equal under both equilibria, the period-2 utility
is higher under IIS since under this equilibrium the subsidy, optimal
for the case α = α¯ − h, can be offered. Suppose now that α = α¯ + h. It
is straightforward that IIS yields a higher utility to the policy maker
than P since under IIS the subsidy, optimal for the case α = α¯ + h, is
offered in period 1.
(iii) Immediate.
(iv) Remember that we consider the case where h >h′′. The expected utility
of the policy maker under the second separating equilibrium, EU I I S ,
can be obtained by substituting S2= λ1M
2
0
λ1M20 (α¯−h)+2λ2−1
and S1 as defined
by (18) into (17). The expected utility in the static setting, EU stat, is
obtained by substituting (11) into (10). Calculating EU I I S − EU stat
yields:
(λ1M20 )
2(α¯ −h)Ψ
4(λ1M20 (α¯ −h)+2λ2−1)(2λ1M20 (α¯ +h)+2λ2−1)(2λ1M20 (α¯2 +h2)+ α¯(2λ2−1))
where
Ψ =4(λ1M20 )2(3h2−α¯2)(h + α¯)−λ1M20 (2λ2−1)(6h2+8α¯2+10hα¯)
−3α¯(2λ2 −1)2
The sign of Ψ determines the sign of the difference EU I I S − EU stat. It
is easy to see that if h ≤
√
3
3 α¯,Ψ < 0 always. If h >
√
3
3 α¯, then Ψ > 0 is
possible iff λ1M20 is large.
(v) This result holds since the second separating equilibrium improves on
the static utility of the policy maker under uncertain α while any other
equilibrium yields a lower utility than the static optimum under uncer-
tain α. 	unionsq
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